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On september 11, 2001, as terrorist planes crashed into the World 
Trade Center in New York City, few 
Americans were likely thinking of 
the rebuilding process that would 
inevitably ensue. However, since the 
site is so deeply invested with both 
commercial and public interests, the 
project to redesign the World Trade 
Center has become one of the most 
unique and challenging revitalization 
projects in history. Today, over four 
years since the attack on the Twin 
Towers, reconstruction has finally 
commenced, as crews at ground 
zero are taking the first steps toward 
building the new Freedom Tower which 
will replace the World Trade Center. 
Although the redesign commission 
for this construction project was 
awarded to Daniel Libeskind in 2003, 
the conflict over what this place should 
represent and who should define those 
parameters is anything but over as 
various political, architectural, and 
cultural forces continue to battle over 
whether commercial or public space should be the 
centerpiece of the new World Trade Center design.
 The attack on the World Trade Center, 
which marks the first attack by a foreign adversary 
on the American mainland since the War of 1812, 
has had a significant psychological and emotional 
impact on Americans across the country.1 This deep 
emotional investment by the American public in 
such a historically significant tragedy can account 
for the extensive public response to the redesign 
commission. However, while the political and 
commercial forces charged with rebuilding the site 
have outwardly appeared to be heavily concerned 
with this outpouring of public sentiment, in reality 
the redesign process has been anything but public. 
This paper seeks to show that rather than learning 
from the past, these private institutions heading the 
revitalization project seem to be repeating the same 
mistakes made by the designers of the original 
World Trade Center in their focus on commercial 
interests and the ensuing rejection of public 
sentiment. While the architectural redesign project 
has the potential to create a new American icon 
1  Fareed Zakaria, “The Return of History,” in How Did 
This Happen? Terrorism and the New War (New York: Council 
on Foreign Relations, Inc., 2001), 308. 
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for freedom and independence, as well as position 
New York City to become the first true twenty-first 
century city, this decision to disregard the input 
of the American public has left the meaning of the 
new Freedom Tower as a response to the terrorist 
attacks both ambiguous and uncertain.
 First, it is beneficial to ascertain exactly what 
the public has demanded of the parties responsible 
for the redesign process. The Civic Alliance to 
Rebuild Downtown New York, a group which has 
brought together multiple civic groups such as 
the New York chapter of the American Institute of 
Architects and the Municipal Art Society, has been 
a strong force in voicing public opinion on the 
redesign project. In their vision statement, the Civic 
Alliance calls for the rebuilding of Lower Manhattan 
as “a regional and global center of culture, and a 
place with a remarkable number of high quality 
public parks and spaces.”2 Overwhelmingly, this 
and other civic groups have called for a public 
space with a diversity of uses as the focus of the 
redesign project, whether those uses be in the 
form of a public memorial, public parks, or other 
configurations of cultural and residential space.
2  Civic Alliance to Rebuild Downtown New York, 
http://www.civic-alliance.org, Vision Statement.
 This desire for a diversity of uses that 
deemphasizes commercial space mirrors the 
demands of the public during the construction of 
the original World Trade Center in the 1960s. Jane 
Jacobs, one of the most influential writers on urban 
planning, wrote in 1961 of the need in cities for “a 
most intricate and close-grained diversity of uses 
that give each other constant mutual support, 
both economically and socially.”3 Jacobs’ call for 
city planners to possess a greater concern for 
integrating new buildings into cities with respect for 
the often historic quality of these neighborhoods 
has been taken up by the civic groups involved in 
the rebuilding process today, as the Civic Alliance 
to Rebuild Downtown New York has criticized 
the “lack of real planning integration between the 
site and its surrounding neighborhood.”4 During 
the time of Jacobs’ writing, the public was highly 
dissatisfied with the World Trade Center project 
and its exclusive focus on commercial office-
space – ten million square feet of it, to be exact. 
The Downtown West Businessmen’s Association 
(DWBA), which represented many of the small retail 
3  Jane Jacobs, The Death and Life of Great American 
Cities (New York: Random House, 1961), 14.
4  Civic Alliance to Rebuild Downtown New York, 
“Planning, Politics and the Public at Ground Zero,” 2.
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merchants in the area, was one of the most vocal 
civic groups to speak out against the World Trade 
Center, and their organization of public protests 
as well as levying court cases against the parties 
responsible for the project design is indicative of 
the dissatisfaction of the general public with the 
original World Trade Center plan.5 However, despite 
this call from civic groups in both the 1960s and 
today for an emphasis on public over commercial 
space at the World Trade Center site, the groups 
behind this development project have been less 
than receptive to integrating public concern into 
their final plans for the site.
 While the American public was dissatisfied 
with the design and function of the World Trade 
Center upon its completion in 1973 – one 
architectural critic describing it as “boring, so 
utterly banal as to be unworthy of the headquarters 
of a bank in Omaha”6 —the public begrudgingly 
came to accept the fact that the twin towers had 
evolved into an iconic part of the New York City 
skyline. The same critic who initially regarded the 
5  Leonard I. Ruchelman, The World Trade Center: 
Politics and Policies of Skyscraper Development (Syracuse: 
Syracuse University Press, 1977), 25.
6  Paul Goldberger, The City Observed: New York 
(New York: Random House, 1979), 3.
towers as “boring” eventually acknowledged that 
“by now the twin towers are icons…. We have 
all come to some sort of accommodation with 
[them].”7 This view was reflected in pop culture, 
which embraced and encouraged their iconic value 
through such representations as the trademark 
image of the 1976 remake of King Kong which 
featured King Kong standing on top of the two 
towers, rather than on the Empire State Building as 
in the original film (Fig. 1). However much the public 
had fought against the design and the idea itself 
for a World Trade Center, the twin towers ultimately 
became an integral piece of the Manhattan skyline 
and a symbol of American power and wealth. As a 
building complex whose function was devoted to 
furthering the United States’ involvement in world 
trade and which housed ten million square feet 
of office-space, the twin towers came to be an 
enormous symbol of American capitalism. 
 Because the World Trade Center site 
had achieved such an immense investment of 
cultural value for the American public by the 
year 2001, value which was only heightened in 
terms of memorial and loss after the terrorist 
attacks of September 11th, the parties responsible 
7  Ibid, 3.
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for reconstructing the site have publicly stated 
their aim of including the American public in the 
planning and rebuilding process. However, these 
political parties, while outwardly appearing to be 
concerned with public sentiment and concern, 
have ultimately disregarded the public in favor of 
their private, commercial constituents. The main 
governmental agency responsible for building the 
original World Trade Center was a group called the 
Port Authority, which still controls the land of the 
site. However, less than a month before the terrorist 
attacks, the Twin Towers were leased to a private 
developer named Larry Silverstein, who still pays 
ten million dollars a month to the Port Authority 
under the terms of his lease.8 The Port Authority 
and its leaseholder Larry Silverstein represent 
the powerful commercial interests whose ties to 
political authorities have complicated the rebuilding 
process.
 Because of his financial investment in the 
World Trade Center site, Larry Silverstein has been 
adamant in demanding that the ten million square 
feet of office space lost in the collapse of the 
towers be replaced in the new site plan. However, 
8  Paul Goldberger, “A New Beginning,” New Yorker 
81, no. 15 (30 May 2005): 54.
since the construction of the World Trade Center 
in the late 1960s, Lower Manhattan has evolved 
from a strictly financial district to a more mixed-
use neighborhood, with upwards of 15,000 people 
taking up residence there at the time of the attacks 
in 2001.9 Despite this transformation, New York 
Governor Pataki, in a private decision made shortly 
after the September 11th attacks, agreed to let 
Silverstein and the Port Authority use the World 
Trade Center site as a platform for rebuilding the 
lost office space.10 Because of the Port Authority’s 
significant monetary tie to their leaseholder 
Silverstein, it can be conjectured that Governor 
Pataki ignored the real needs of Lower Manhattan 
in terms of urban planning in favor of the decision 
that would give his commercial constituents the 
best financial benefit – allowing Silverstein to 
rebuild his lost office space.
 This focus on unnecessary office space 
in the revitalization process is a mistake that the 
Port Authority has made once before – during the 
construction of the original World Trade Center in 
the 1960s. While today’s Lower Manhattan has 
9  Ibid, 54.
10  Paul Goldberger, “Dashed hopes for a charged site: 
What went wrong at Ground Zero,” Architectural Record 193, 
no. 9 (September 2005), 61.
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developed into a neighborhood with a diversity of 
uses and inhabitants, fifty years ago it was known 
strictly as the financial center of New York. Because 
of the concentration of exclusively commercial 
businesses rather than housing or cultural amenities 
during this time, Lower Manhattan began to fail 
economically as businesses left for more diversified 
areas of New York City.11 As a shortsighted solution 
to the problems facing Lower Manhattan, the 
Port Authority and David Rockefeller, the wealthy 
businessman who helped push the idea of a World 
Trade Center into reality, seemed to believe that 
building more office space would turn around 
the neighborhood’s economy. Thus, the political 
constituencies behind the original World Trade 
Center construction, like those overseeing the 
reconstruction project today, yielded to the short-
term financial incentive offered by commercial 
space rather than address the need and demand  
for public, cultural, and residential space in  
Lower Manhattan.
 Although Governor Pataki could have 
chosen to buy out Silverstein and the Port Authority 
with the insurance proceeds from the destruction of 
11  Paul Goldberger, Up From Zero: Politics, Architec-
ture, and the Rebuilding of New York (New York: Random 
House, 2005), 21.
the twin towers and end the convoluted relationship 
with these commercial interests, he decided 
instead to concede to the Port Authority, perhaps 
conjecturing that it would be the fastest track to 
rebuilding the World Trade Center site and please 
his political constituents.12 In an effort to appear 
concerned with public opinion, Pataki created 
yet another governmental agency to oversee the 
reconstruction process – the Lower Manhattan 
Development Corporation (LMDC) – less than 
two months after September 11th.  Although the 
LMDC mission statement asserts that the group 
is “committed to a … planning process in which 
the public has a central role,”13 there are no citizen 
representatives on the board, which is composed 
entirely of Republican members. 
 While in structure the LMDC is clearly 
disregarding the public, the design competition 
initiated by the group in the fall of 2002 was an 
attempt to appear open to public opinion. For this 
competition, the agency released a call to architects 
both in the United States and around the world to 
submit plans for a new design of the World Trade 
12  Goldberger, “A New Beginning,” 54.
13  Lower Manhattan Development Corporation, http://
www.renewnyc.com, Mission Statement.
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Center site.14 The design parameters, which were 
dictated by the Port Authority, outlined exactly what 
these agencies expected from the participants. 
While the parameters include a lengthy 
discussion of the memorial, cultural, residential, 
and transportation requirements of the design 
competition, there is one guideline listed which 
ultimately came to dominate all of the proposals 
submitted: the requirement of including 6.5 – 10.0 
million square feet of office space.15 However much 
emphasis the program guidelines devote to the 
real demands of the public, namely, public space 
including memorial and cultural elements, the 
condition of including such an enormous amount 
of office space necessitates that this commercial 
space be the focus of the design proposals. 
Thus, despite the appearance of a democratic 
competition where participants are freely able to 
express the desires of the public in terms of design, 
the commercial parameters imposed by the Port 
Authority signify once again that the revitalization 
process has been anything but public.
Interestingly, this exclusion of public 
sentiment in terms of design mirrors the design 
14  Ibid, 4.
15  Ibid, 14.
process of the original World Trade Center. In 
August, 1962, the Port Authority selected Minoru 
Yamasaki as the architect for its project, despite 
concern from architectural critics and New York City 
residents alike.16 Not only were they skeptical of the 
particulars of his design, but also of the decision 
to build such massive skyscrapers altogether, 
evidenced by critics such as Ada Louise Huxtable, 
who wrote in a 1962 article in the New York Times: 
“The Issue is whether Yamasaki is the best, or 
the worst, thing to hit the profession since the 
skyscraper.”17 Weary of the destruction of historic 
neighborhoods that colossal building projects such 
as this one had instigated – as in the demolition of 
the old Penn Station in 1963 to make way for the 
Madison Square Garden sports complex – citizens 
such as Huxtable objected to the gigantism of the 
World Trade Center skyscrapers during their original 
construction. Despite an outpouring of protest from 
everyday citizens and architectural critics alike, the 
Port Authority saw their extremely unpopular World 
Trade Center plan into completion with Yamasaki 
as their leading architect, choosing not to include 
the public whatsoever in their design selection. 
16  Glanz and Lipton, 38.
17  Ada Louise Huxtable, “Pools, Domes, Yamasaki – 
Debate,” New York Times Magazine, 25 November 1962, 36.
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Although the design process for the new site has 
excluded the public in a less overt way than the 
original World Trade Center venture, both projects 
have used design to focus on private, commercial 
interests rather than incorporate public concern.
As expected by the LMDC competition 
guidelines, the six proposals selected as finalists 
all centered on the idea of building skyscrapers 
to replace Silverstein’s lost office space. As one 
architectural critic noted in an analysis of these 
proposals, “[t]he public components of a memorial 
and various cultural buildings occupy a clear 
secondary position.”18 The two final proposals 
selected by the LMDC were submitted by Daniel 
Libeskind and Rafael Viñoly, and they differed 
most markedly in their attribution of prominence 
to either commercial or cultural space. While 
the Libeskind design had a 1,776-foot-tall spire 
housing principally office space, which would later 
come to be known as the Freedom Tower, as its 
centerpiece (Fig. 2), Viñoly and his team proposed a 
pair of latticework towers housing cultural facilities 
as its focus, relegating the commercial office space 
to less substantial buildings on the sidelines of 
18  Goldberger, “Dashed hopes for a chaged site: What 
went wrong at Ground Zero,” 61.
the space (Fig. 3). While the joint committee of the 
LMDC and the Port Authority charged with  
making the final decision in the design competition 
made clear their backing of Viñoly and his  
emphasis on public over private space, Governor 
George Pataki had a different agenda. On February 
25, 2003, one day after the site committee voted  
in favor of Viñoly’s design, Governor Pataki  
reversed the decision and chose Libeskind as the 
winning architect.19 
 Not only did Pataki undermine the 
‘democracy’ of the competition by overruling the 
site committee’s decision, but he also affirmed 
his devotion to the private, commercial interests 
invested in the site by selecting the design that 
gave the most substantial focus to commercial 
space – that of Daniel Libeskind.
Like the public reception of the World Trade 
Center in the 1960s, Libeskind’s winning proposal 
in 2003 promoted a negative public response for 
its creation of a commercial skyscraper as its focal 
point. Architectural critic Robert Campbell asked: 
“Do we really wish to choose, for our country’s new 
national symbol, a box of leasable office space?”20 
19  Goldberger, Up From Zero, 166.
20  Robert Campbell, “Freedom Tower redux: sending all 
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Still others questioned the rationality of using 
height to reassert the site as an icon for America, 
as Libeskind’s 1,776-foot-tall Freedom Tower was 
and still is being billed as the tallest tower in the 
world. As one critic asked, “Why build the tallest? 
Why not build the safest tower in the world? The 
strongest tower? The most sustainable?”21 Civic 
groups also expressed their dissatisfaction with 
Libeskind’s plan, as the Regional Plan Association, 
a partner group to the Civic Alliance to Rebuild 
Downtown New York, published in a recent report 
their discontent that “an office space program 
of ten million feet continues to shape the World 
Trade Center master plan, despite lack of funding, 
unsupportive market conditions and a united civic 
community calling for a different approach.”22 
Even though Pataki dubbed the monumental 
skyscraper designed by Libeskind as the “Freedom 
Tower,” perhaps in yet another move to appeal to 
the sentimental concerns of a traumatized public, 
the wrong messages,” Architectural Record 193, no. 9 (Sep-
tember 2005), 67.
21  Abby Bussel, “As the World (Trade Center) Turns,” 
Architecture 92, no. 9 (September 2003), 11.
22  Regional Plan Association, “A Civic Assessment of 
the Lower Manhattan Planning Process: A Regional Plan As-
sociation report to the Civic Alliance,” (October 2004), 6.
this signifier does not coincide with the signified. 
While perhaps in Pataki’s mind democracy and 
freedom are epitomized by the unchecked private 
ownership and economic growth reflected in the 
commercial space of the Freedom Tower, this is not 
the opinion of the majority of the population,  
as evidenced by the outpouring of negative 
responses to Libeskind’s plan and the Freedom 
Tower in particular.
Today, nearly three years after the selection 
of Daniel Libeskind’s master plan for the rebuilding 
program, construction on the Freedom Tower has 
finally begun. However, this is not the Freedom 
Tower that Libeskind envisioned in his original 
plan. Larry Silverstein, the leaseholder on the site, 
appointed his architect David Childs from the 
firm Skidmore, Owings and Merrill to redesign the 
Freedom Tower. After all, Libeskind’s proposal was 
only a ‘guideline:’ the LMDC was free to redesign 
it however it saw fit. Thus, the design competition 
– the pinnacle of the revitalization process and 
the ploy which political powers have used to 
appear open to public input – has actually been 
the least democratic aspect of the entire process. 
Although the public has been deeply concerned 
with the future of the World Trade Center site, 
58 Devotion, Discord, Deceit 
the commercial and political forces behind the 
rebuilding process have excluded public sentiment 
along every step of this project. These political 
parties have gone through great pains to make it 
appear as though they are focused on the wants 
and needs of the American public; however, in a 
striking similarity to the construction of the original 
World Trade Center nearly fifty years ago, these 
groups have shown throughout the redesign 
process that their loyalty to commercial interests far 
outweighs any form of public sentiment or concern.
Figure 1
John Berkey for Paramount Pictures, 
King Kong, 1976
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Figure 3
Rafael Viñoly and THINK team,
Plan for World Cultural Center, 2003
Figure 2
Studio Libeskind
Plan for Freedom Tower, 2003
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